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**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DUNCAN HUNTER,
CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARING ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SECURITY ISSUES**

The Subcommittee meets today to hear testimony on security issues at the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons complex. One would think that such a hearing would be unnecessary. Of *all* the items owned by the federal government, and *all* the secrets held, one would think that nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons design information would be among the things most closely guarded. A loss of any of these items could have catastrophic consequences.

Think of what could happen if a quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material is stolen from the DOE complex. A number of our adversaries are attempting to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons – Iran, Iraq, North Korea. Weapons-usable nuclear material is the “long pole in the tent” in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The enrichment of uranium to produce weapons-usable nuclear material is a difficult and time-consuming process. We cannot allow the theft of such material from the DOE nuclear weapons complex to be a temptation. It cannot appear to be even a remote possibility.

Unfortunately, the threat to the DOE complex is not limited to foreign states or groups seeking weapons-usable nuclear materials. Within our own borders there may be individuals, or groups of individuals, that could seek to exploit a perceived weakness in the DOE security apparatus. To send their message of terror they would not need to go to the trouble of incorporating nuclear material into a weapon to create a nuclear explosion. The same material could be used to contaminate population centers with devastating effect.

We hope that we never see lapses in the DOE physical security posture that would allow such nightmares to occur. However, we must remain vigilant. Before the latest Chinese espionage incidents, who would ever have thought that we would hear reports of the theft of U.S. nuclear weapon design information from our DOE laboratories?

The testimony we will hear today should not be regarded as mere matters of compliance with another long list of regulations. Failures in security processes and systems at the nuclear weapons complex could lead to irreparable harm to our country.

(More)

We will first hear testimony from **Mr. Edward McCallum**. Mr. McCallum was an employee of the Department of Energy for 25 years, and the Director of the Office of Safeguards and Security at DOE for the last 10.

We will next hear testimony from **Mr. Glenn Podonsky**, the Director of DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. Mr. Podonsky's office evaluates security and emergency operations at Department of Energy facilities.

Mr. Gil Weigand, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Strategic Computing and Simulation will then discuss the sale of a supercomputer by Sandia National Laboratory which could have had national security and proliferation implications. He will be followed by **Dr. John Robinson**, the director of Sandia, who will explain the sale and recovery of the computer.

Finally, **General Eugene Habiger**, often referred to as DOE's new "security czar" is the Director of the DOE Office of Security and Emergency Operations will describe the efforts of his office to improve DOE security.

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